I. " Spinoza " in England at the Turn of the Century
The figure of Benedictus de Spinoza appeared to his contemporaries, as it has often since appeared to readers, remote and even obscure. Of all the great seventeenth-century philosophers, Spinoza's life and the sources of his thought are least kn0wn.l The reactions of his contemporaries to Spinoza's life and thought, his influence upon these and later thinkers are still " problems" to the intellectual historian. This essay is part of a larger effort to solve one such problem in Spinoza criticism: the delineation of the changing attitudes of British thinkers towards Spinoza from 1670, the year of publication of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, to the beginning of the twentieth century. Here we confine ourselves to an examination of the English Deists for about a half-century after 1670.
Spinoza's early critics depended upon biographies and commentaries written by men with particular axes to grind, usually axes sharpened against Spinoza's stiff neck. In itself, the fact that his contemporaries felt impelled to write so much about the man, whom most of them hated and feared, is telling. They simply had to explainlim to themselves because he did not fit into any convenient pattern of atheism or of heroism.
A man reading the Ethics at the end of the seventeenth century or early in the eighteenth who wanted to know more about its author would find very odd sources of information at hand. From Spinoza's own few works very little might be learned about their author, compared with the many volumes published by Descartes and by Hobbes. After his death in 1677, only three volumes were in print, his commentary on Descartes' Pm'nciples, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Opera Posthuma, seen through the press by his friends. Other works were attributed to Spinoza, notably the republican publications associated with Johan de Witt's circle; since that time, other genuine works have come to light, The Short Treatise on God, Man, and Well-Being, an optical study of the rainbow and of a work on the laws of chance, all unavailable to his contemporaries; only fragments of the last two are known.2
The Life of B. de Spinoza was written in French by a Lutheran minister in The Hague, Jean (or Johannes) Colerus, who happened for a time to have occupied the very rooms vacated by Spinoza at his death. Strongly opposed to Spinoza's doctrine as he was, Colerus showed nonetheless a real admiration for the man and a certain sympathy for his difficult position in society. The situation is a curious one: as a minister Colerus could not condone the specific teachings of either the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus or the Opera Posth~r n a ,ỹ et the warmth of his tone in speaking of Spinoza's actual behavior betrays his genuine interest in the man and suggests as well that Spinoza's old landlord and landlady presented their lodger's character in such a way as to catch Colerus' imagination. Under his pen, indeed, Spinoza's virtues appear almost conventionally hagiographical, his behavior singular and rare. He had, Colerus tells, the good protestant virtues of frugality, sobriety, and silence; he was neat, spare, and formal in his appearance and dress; " h e was besides very courteous and obliging to those " about him. He had great personal integrity, manifest in his refusal first of a pension offered by the Jews, then of a professorship at Heidelberg.ll He had also personal courage and calm, as his cool behavior showed when a fanatic attacked him with a knife. This courage was no momentary thing, but a part of his character: when Spinoza returned to The Hague from Utrecht in 1672, it was known that he had met there with Condi and his house was soon surrounded by a threatening city mob. Though mobs in The Hague were not to be taken lightly after the lynching of the De Witts, Spinoza thus comforted his fearful landlord: (London, 1927) , Introduction, has a full discussion of the conditions surrounding the writing of the book and the reasons why it remained so long unpublished.
8 Jean Colerus, La Vie de B . de Spinosa (The Hague, 1706) ; (London, Spinoza showed certain other virtues too, surprising in view of his reputation for atheism. His enemies would surely have doubted that it was possible for him to advocate so religious a thing, but Colerus reports: '' He put the Children in mind of going to Church, and taught them to be obedient and dutiful to their Parents " 13-which Richard Baxter, for instance, specifically denied.14 Most moving of all the events in his book was Colerus' account of Spinoza's death. The death of a great man has always had the power to move, and in Colerus' hands Spinoza's death was exemplary. He died showing " in all his sufferings, a truly Stoical constancy," honored by all his friends and the members of his household. So simple and dignified were the goods disposed of by his will that from them one could read, in Colerus' words, " the Inventory of a true Philosopher."
translated into English as T h e Life of Benedict de Spinosa Written by John Colerus
If Colerus' life had been the only comment on Spinoza, the philosopher might have fared better at the hands of contemporary readers than he did. But in spite of his later success in eighteenth-century France, for example, and in nineteenth-century Germany, in his own time Spinoza was little honored, particularly in his own country.16 To the seventeenth-century mind, the facts of Spinoza's life, however interpreted, were few, inescapable, and damning. He was a Jewwhich was bad enough in that reforming century, but he was not even a good Jew, having been excommunicated by his congregation.17 Thereafter he remained quite unconnected with any Christian community, though he had associations with several; and he died without benefit of clergy and without professing any recognizable seventeenthcentury God. It is not surprising that his life became, almost too conveniently, the model of infidelity and atheism for men who needed a whipping-boy in the philosophical and theological debates at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth.
Some of the whippers are surprising, however. (Paris, 1937) . I n her definitive Nederlandse Cartesianisme, C.-L. Thyssen Schoute has a good deal to say about developing Dutch reaction to Spinoza's thought; she plans to continue her discussion of Spinoza in a second volume. For France, see the excellent study by Paul VerniBre, Spinoza et la Pense'e Fran~aise avant la R h olution (Paris, 1954,2 vols.) . I have touched upon some aspects of the anti-Spinozan reaction in England in my Light and Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1957) (London, 1909), 87. ence upon the deist program so critical in the development of the English Enlightenment: " it is enough to remark that the whole essence of the deist position may be found in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. A few of the philosopher's pages have expanded into volumes and libraries of discussions; but the germs of the whole discussion are present." 27 I t becomes important, then, to understand the elements of Spinoza's particular thought which made his work so attractive to the early deists.
II. Spinoxa and Deist Politics
Deism itself is not easy to delineate. Evidently a man could be a deist and go to church, even be an ordained minister of the Church of England, like Samuel Clarke; he could be a deist and the leader of a conservative government, like Bolingbroke; he could be a deist, an aristocrat, a radical, and a worldly philosopher, like Shaftesbury; he could be a deist and oppose all Tory politics and most Whig policies, like Tindal; he could be a deist, a radical in political theory and a conventional Whig in politics, like Toland; he could be a deist and devote himself to pure, or relatively pure, philosophical problems, like Collins. The one thing a man could not do, a t the end of the seventeenth-century, was to be a deist and keep silent.
I n a classic article,28 Professor Lovejoy has enumerated the basic tenets of deism: uniformitarianism in human nature and in religion; rational individualism; appeal to a consensus gentium; cosmopolitanism; antipathy to enthusiasm and originality; a negative theory of history based on a uniform standard. The title of this article, " The Parallel of Deism and Classicism," reveals its aim-the author describes deism at its height, an archetypal deism, to which there were, particularly in its early days, exceptions in whole or in part. The parallel of deism to classicism is valid in the sense that both programs were reactions against the prevailing disorder of the Augustan Age in England: on close examination, that reasonable, rationalist, classical period from 1660 to 1740 appears to be as complex, irrational, eccentric, and inconsistent as many less apparently " organized " periods of history, with religious, political, economic, and social problems of a very disturbing nature.
I n its early days, deism was far more chaotic than Mr. Lovejoy's archetype and dealt less with general laws of thought and of society than with what Locke called " the reasonableness of Christianity," or with the rational proofs of a deity believed to be supremely ra- tional. The deists' rationalism led them not to a bland superiority to immediate events and issues but to a thorough, if not radical, determination to be a part of the political mechanism designed to bring about the ideal state of mankind that they postulated. The fact that their religio-philosophical and radical political ideas so often coincided simply filled the orthodox with greater determination to oppose them and, if possible, by opposing to end them.
Charles Blount and Charles Gildon, the earliest noticeable and identifiable English deists, were both politically active, regularly producing pamphlets in defense of a republican society and politics. They were followed by two extremely public Whigs, Matthew Tindal and-John Toland, who agitated more professionally for the most radical policies the Whig party could bear. I n their political activity, the deists of the late seventeenth-century were the carriers into eighteenth-century political thought of the theories of the Commonwealth,29 borne in curious admixture with various radical notions from continental sources.
Their politics had its basis in a rationalist program that made them to a man reconsider the tenets of orthodox religion; their rationalist and " scientific " 30 habits of thought led them to fierce attacks upon scripture, upon revelation, upon prophecy and miracle as proper foundations for belief in God. Naturally enough, they were in search for some support for their ideas, something to give weight to their assaults upon what was for other men the single sufficient authority of Scripture, by its very existence the witness to its own truth. The deists had to take great'care: they could not rely on such figures as Machiavelli, Vanini, or Hobbes 31 without laying themselves open 29 For the r61e in which Milton was cast, for example, by the early deist and Whig writers (many of whom were identical), see George Sensabaugh, That Grand Whig Milton (Stanford and London, 1952) , Chapters IV and V. I am greatly indebted to Professor Caroline Robbins of Bryn Mawr, who has just completed a book on English, Scottish, Irish, and American radicals of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.
30 Blount, Collins, and Tindal were certainly much interested in the development of the natural sciences and in a method of limited empiricism; for instance, from the auction-catalogue of Anthony Collins' Library (Bibliotheca Antonij Collins . . . which will begin to be Sold on the 18th Day of January l737), we can read his active interest in the specific preoccupations of modern science. None of these men, however, was even an amateur practitioner of science, as philosophers of the previous generation had usually been (More, Cudworth, Locke) ; they simply directed the formulations of natural science toward their own philosophical ends. 31 We may assume that the deists had read Hobbes, as most educated men had in the late seventeenth century. Occasionally Hobbes' attacks on miracle and prophecy were cited, as in Blount's Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (see below, Part 111); but on the whole the early deists did not rely upon Hobbes as authority for their views. There are several reasons for this: first, whatever in fact his unorthodox religious beliefs may have been, Hobbes was consistently read to the charge of atheism they labored so to avoid. Their authorities had to be men asserting their thesis, that religion is to be read more convincingly from reasonable apprehension of the works of God than from irrational, eccentric, or arbitrary revelation, whether personal or scriptural. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, whose views were measured and temperate; Locke, who distinguished himself from the deists' position, although many elements in his philosophy lent the deists authority and support; 32 and Spinoza, who did not wrangle with his enemies, were therefore all sympathetic sources of authority for the early deists, Locke and Spinoza helpful in forming their politics as well as their religion. They were perfectly conventional men of their times in that, like Locke and Spinoza, they held that a viable politics had to rest upon a correct understanding of man's relation to God and of God's intentions for the world He had created.
Religion was, of course, a basis for practical politics as well as for political theory. The material dealing with King William's invasion and succession-later called the Glorious Revolution-the pamphlets, sermons, and studies published for or against the change in the sovereign, all turned on the question of religion. Since the political behavior of 1688 and 1689 was, though cast in religious terms, essentially radical, it is not surprising that the year 1689 saw published and referred to by his contemporaries as an atheist; and the deists were concerned constantly to assert their own conspicuous, if anticlerical, theism. Though Spinoza too often suffered the charge of atheism, his theism lay open and extremely plain to sympathetic readers, whereas Hobbes's did not. Second, the early deists were political radicals and, whatever their sympathy for Hobbes' rationalism, they could not accept his conservative and absolutistic theory of the state and, therefore, tended to call very little upon his rationalist resources. Finally, as I suggest below (in Part 111), the pessimism of Hobbes's view of human nature ran directly counter to the optimism and pride with which essentially Blount, Collins, Tindal, and The Crape Gown and the Long Robe " might criticize as they chose; the translator cared no whit for them, since no ('part of his Reputation depended upon the Judgment of Fools or Knaves." He asked no more of any reader than that "he will deliberately read the Book twice over, before he condemn or commend it ": Spinoza himself had asked less.
The life and political opinions of Spinoza, so independent and disinterested, undoubtedly had considerable appeal to deist radicals, since they too had to cultivate a certain detachment from conventional society and politics. All readers knew that Spinoza had had 33 The Term Catalogues, 1688 -1689 A.D., ed. E. Arber (London, 1903 . . but the Nation a t last finding they had done nothing for the publick good, by putting to Death their Lawful King, and by changing he Government, had brought themselves into a Condition worse than they were in before, they resolved to return from whence they had strayed; nor were they quiet until they saw all things restor'd to their former state.35
I n the period after t h e 1688 Revolution, Spinoza's sharply reasoned argument for toleration supported Englishmen like Blount, Gildon, and Toland, who sought precedents for their views wherever they could find any, whether among the theorists of t h e Commonwealth or of t h e continent. Spinoza, so thoroughly secular, criticized the theological schisms provoked whenever liberty of thought was restricted b y law, and condemned t h e brutality involved in administering such l e g i~l a t i o n .~For him, indeed, liberty of thought was inseparable from virtue and education :
Such is mens Nature, that nothing is a greater Vexation to them, than to see those Opinions, which they verily believe to be true, condemn'd, and themselves accounted wicked and sinful, for doing that which they think is their Duty, both towards God and Man. This makes them detest the Laws, and count any seditious Attempts against the Magistrate lawful and just. I n Laws against Opinions, wicked men are seldom concern'd; such Laws are commonly made, not to restrain bad, but to provoke good men . . . Such Laws are likewise ~s e l e s s .~'
Liberty of thought was not simply a privilege of scholars, it was also basic to a nation growing in power, " very necessary to the Advancement of Arts and Sciences, in which the greatest proficiency is made by those men who have their Judgments free from preoccupation." Practical politics was important in human life, both as a reflection of eternal truth and as a means to human freedom: men are so t o be govern'd, that tho' they be of different and contrary Opinions, they may live together in peace and amity. Without doubt this way of Governing is best, and subject to least Inconvenience, seeing it is most agreeable to Mens Nature. For in a Democratical Government (which comes nearest t o the State of Nature) all covenan6 t o act, but not to reason and judge by common Consent; my meaning is, because all men cannot think the same things, they have agreed to make that a binding Law which had most Voices, reserving still a Power of repealing that Law, when they thought fit.38
The most successful example of this " Democratical Government," cited by Englishmen in search of a paradigm for liberty and toleration, was the free city of Amsterdam; 39 and Spinoza cited it as well as Henry Robinson, John Lilburne, and Roger Williams. To his enemies, Spinoza appeared to open the way to no religion at all; to his admirers, he gave the classic disinterested statement of the practical and philosophical bases of religious and political toleration.
In practical politics, no successful doctrine of toleration had a t that time been published. The party that came nearest to the Spinozan program was the anti-Orangist party of Johan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland so horribly killed in the rising of 1672. De Witt's policies had been far less absolute than Spinoza's hypotheses for liberty, far more involved in the mundane empirical details of law and economics; but in the eyes of his enemies, De Witt's policies were sufficiently " Spinozan " to enable them, after his death, to slander his memory by making him an associate of the philosopher.
The question of Spinoza's dealings with De Witt is less important than the cultural fact that his " atheistical " politics could be interpreted by the enemies of republicanism as identical with Wittian polit i c~. *T hough nothing in modern scholarship confirms a personal connection between the two men, De Witt's part in a famous text in political economy, preaching some of the same ends as theTractatus Theologico-Politicus, has been established. Matthew Tindal is a fine example of early deism: his book, Christianity as Old as t h e Creation, published in 1730, was a major argument for the eternal reasonableness of a religion made manifest in the very existence of the physical world, and a reasoned denial of the validity of particular revelation. He was passionately radical in politics and passionately anti-clerical in religion and in politics. His attacks upon the Church of Rome and the High-Flying Tories within the Church of England would have been enough to make him seem " Spinozan " in the general sense in which that epithet was used, but he provided further specifically Spinozan grounds for his critics' objections. In a series of publications, written from 1694 to 1706, he followed the old Arminian, or new Spinozan and Lockean, view that the magistrate had power to legislate in religious matters, though no power to compel conformity-an argument directed against the strict demands of the Test Act. His reasoning reiterated his belief in the futility of persecution for belief and stressed with anti-clerical fervor (London, 1706, 2nd ed., corrected) . the necessary reliance upon a tolerant m a g i~t r a t e .~~ Hickes, Carroll, and Le Clerc all assumed that Tindal's arguments derived from the pseudo-Spinoza of De Jure-and they did not admire Tindal the more for his quotation from Toland's Amyntor, the life of the great republican of the Commonwealth, John Milton.44 Like Milton, Locke, and Toland, Tindal's toleration was a limited one: he excluded the atheist from the natural liberties accorded all other men on the grounds that since the principles of atheism destroy conscience, atheists could not plead for toleration on the basis of their conscientious belief. 45 Tindal persisted in his views until his death in 1733, always maintaining a consistent radicalism in politics, even in the face of an increasingly conservative official Whiggery, and a consistently radical deism in his religious views. His more flamboyant contemporary, John Toland, whose varied intellectual contribution deserves more careful attention than it has hitherto a t t r a~t e d ,~~ was an even more effective propagandist for deism. Toland's social origins suggest a potentially great radicalism: he was born in Ireland, and, as if this were by itself insufficient, he was said by his enemies to have been the son of a priest.47 He admitted his Irish birth, but denied being the son of a priest. Brought up as a Roman Catholic, he underwent various stages of conversion to an ultimate radical Protestantism. He studied officially neither at Oxford nor at Cambridge, but at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Leiden, patching together an extremely wide range of interests into a philosophy of considerable span. With the publication of his Christianity Not Mysterious in 1696 and with its burning ordered shortly after, by the Middlesex Grand Jury, Toland's reputation as a radical thinker was made.48 For a time his notoriety was sufficient to dislodge him from the most seminal intellectual groups of London and Dublin society, but he did not come to grief. After a short period filled with energetic writing, he was able to become one Though a consistent crier-up of liberty, Toland never advocated Spinoza's democracy, " which,'' he said, " I think to be the worst Form of a Common-wealth, tho a thousand Times better than any sort of Tyranny," 50 Toland's political efforts were directed toward the straightforward and consistent advocacy of free trade, of freely-elected parliaments, and of a permanent Protestant dynasty in England, upon whose leaders he urged generous laws of toleration. Like Tindal, Toland was a political radical who, once convinced, remained articulately radical all his life long. His political tracts are all " Spinozan " in that they advocated the policies often attributed to Spinoza, but they were also quite unSpinozan in their determined arguments for the familiar Protestant God of toleration and in their outspoken anti-Catholicism. I t is not so much in Toland's politics as in his philosophy that we must look for the deepest Spinozan influence upon him.
III. Spinoza in Deist Religion and Philosophy
Though Spinoza's politics played a part in deist works, his chief contributions to their arguments were religious and philosophical. In the hands of many deists the complexities of Spinoza's theology and metaphysics often turned into a weapon against conventional orthodoxy, transformed from the two-edged blade of reasoning he had himself forged. The earliest direct use of the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus in England was made by Charles Blount, who published anonymously a free translation of Spinoza's Chapter VI, " On Miracles," in his Miracles, N o Violation of the Laws of Nature (London, 1683 ' Theologico-Politicus, Mr. Hobb's Leviathan, &c. (London, 1683) . Although he did not know at the time who was responsible for the publication of Blount's book, Browne recognized its evil motivation a t once : the sixth chapter of the Tractatus had been chosen " as effectual by it self to compass the design of his whole Treatise: viz. To instill the Principles of Deisme or Atheisme into the minds of his Readers." 51 He had studied the Ethics as well as the Tractatus and knew that the nature Spinoza postulated was not the simple mechanistic nature of, say, Galileo, but " the whole aggregate and compages of the Bodies in the World and the Order in which they act "-as well as an " infinite number of things beside matter." 52 For him, as for Henry More and his fellow-Platonists, the miracles by proving the providence and generosity of God to Man proved also His benevolence and free will. The proof itself thus clearly separated God from His creation, not as " Spinoxa asserts, that nothing can happen contrary to Nature: viz. because God and Nature are one and the same thing, God Nature subsistent, and Nature God modified." Spinoza's argument " plainly terminates in one of these two, Atheism or Idolatry " 53-for Blount to have selected Spinoza as his source spoke for his impiety.
The Tractatus was itself answered at about this time by Matthias Erbery (Earbery, Erbury), a " School-Master of Wye in Kent," whose long refutation of the Tractatus appeared in 1697 under two titles 54 and attempted " a Collective Answer to the whole Book " rather than the usual random anti-Spinozist commentary, always for Erbery " too Philosophical, or too Philological." 56 The book was a dialogue between Logicus, " an old, grave Clergyman," and Scepticus, a young man misled. Widely read in the mechanical philosopher Descartes, in the atomist Gassendus, and in the dangerous religious writings of Scepticus and Logicus discuss the questions raised by the Tractatus-prophecy, revelations, miracles, the historicity of the Pentateuch, the nature of God, the propriety of using the mathematical method for religious proof-until Scepticus finally yields to the overwhelming logic and authority of Logicus (whose name in the middle of the book suddenly changes to " Theist "). Scepticus agrees that man is basically a Hobbist brute who can be saved only by the proper inculcation of spirituality into his s y~t e m ,~~-a n interesting line of argument. Erbery establishes the Hobbist view of man in the state of nature as a true description of life on earth; so dreadful to contemplate was the Hobbist society that it must at once induce religion to palliate its horror. The Spinozan view of man, clearly far less pessimistic than the Hobbist, offered an alternative to orthodoxy by its postulation of a man who might be expected, with his greater potentialities and independence, to raise himself to blessedness without any priestly intervention. For all its " atheism," Hobbes's deeply unhappy view of human nature served the conservative orthodox argument well in its refutation of Spinoza.
Conservatives like Erbery might rely on Hobbist argument, but Hobbes's political absolutism closed his work to Blount and Gildon, devoted to republican and Commonwealth policies. Spinoza offered a distinct " democracy " to accompany his radical religious views, and thus satisfactorily supported Blount's various views. In his Religio Laici, for instance, Blount demonstrated considerable " Spinozism " in his discussions of metaphysics and theology, particularly in his classic deist attacks upon prophecy, miracle, and the life after death.58 Unfortunately for his cause, in 1693 Blount killed himself, thus tidily justifying his orthodox opponents in their assertions of deist i m m~r a l i t y .~~ to though Blount and Dedicated rationalism 56 Zbid. Gildon were-Gildon explained that Blount died " by the precepts of Nature and Reason "-neither was a serious deist. Rather the two Inen were publicists and propagandists for liberty-liberty in politics, in learning, in religion.
Anthony Collins, educated at Eton and King's, a lawyer and the close friend of Locke in the philosopher's old age, was a far more interesting and cunning thinker than they. By himself, Collins shows quite plainly the sort of anomaly later critics have come to suspect within deism. He was a reputable squire's son who married money, conversed with the learned, and remained socially quite conventional; unlike most such men, he helped to formulate the most radical positions of deism. Collins was truly a philosophical deist, perhaps the first in England, and he did his work in his gentlemanly library, rather than in the scrimmage of political ~a m p h l e t e e r i n g .~~ Collins' chief attentionwas not directed to politics; compared with Tindal and Toland, Collins had very little influence upon contemporary politics. He did take the typical deist's interest in religion, however, and produced one of the major deist religious texts of the century, the Discourse on the Grounds and Origilzs of the Christian Religion, published in 1734. His views of the Bible were the " reasonable " ones of Locke: he looked upon ,Scripture as a series of documents written at different times, the authenticity of which must often be called into question.61 In the matter of miracles Collins asserted the Spinozan position that God can do only what is " possible "; that His prescience does not exclude the exercise of man's decisive free In a book ostensibly written in response to Archbishop King's famous sermon on predestination 63 but actually presenting more fully ideas he had already expressed, Collins presented a Spinozan God of an extremely abstract nature, to whom human senses and forms were inappropriate and to whom they should not, even analogically, be man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as is in clockes, watches, and other beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity.71
Collins' psychology was obviously Lockean, but he carried the particular kind of necessity that man is under far beyond the limits ~o c k e suggested in his Essay. ColIins reasoned thus: man is a necessary agent because all his actions have a beginning or a cause; if a cause is not a necessary cause, it is no cause at all; therefore liberty of will is not only impossible but also, because it denies God's ultimate power as first cause and originator of all causes in man, a t h e i~t i c a l .~~ For him, then, the free-will defense of religion so constantly reiterated in his period, the incessant cry of the Boyle Lecturers and other anti-deistical writers, was trivial, since " Liberty is both the real foundation of popular Atheism, and has been the profes'd principle of the Atheists themselves." He went on to say, "fate or the necessity of events, has been esteem'd a religious opinion and been the profess'd opinion of the religious, both among the Heathens and Jews, and also of that great Convert to 'Christianity, and great converter of others, St. Paul." 73 Human liberty in Collins' moral world, as in Spinoza's, lay in a true understanding of the limits of life and an understanding -conforming to God's unalterable universal plan. 74 Collins did not even permit the free-will explanation to account for the origin of evil: for him as for Spinoza so-called evil had to proceed, like everything else, from the omnipotent deity, its place to be understood in the totality of things, its problems to be dealt with by 70 As conclusive proof, Collins resorted to the empirical and rationalist argument :
The Doctrine of the Necessity of Human Actions is unattended with all the Absurdities that of Free Will labours under, since i t is intended to prove no more than what every unprejudiced M a n without Argument will assert to. That each Being Acts the P a r t which his Creator brought him on the Stage t o perform. What Contradiction more irreconcileable, than that any thing should resist his Will, for whose Good Pleasure, and by whose Power alone 'twas Created, and in whom All things Live, Move, and have their Being, and who is well pleas'd with the Works of his Hands. 77 Collins' views, in his mind securely based on Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity and Essay o n Human Understanding, were the most strongly argued formulations of radical deism in the period of its development. His two works on human liberty were the only ones that genuinely attacked the problem of causation with an eye to morality, and in this his chief precedent was Spinoza's Ethics. Collins Nonetheless, these opinions were wrong, and not simply on religious grounds. Toland criticized his philosopher at diverse points: he could not accept Spinoza's account of how matter came into motion; m he found Xpinoza's terminology misleading in that Spinoza had, he said, taken abstract notions for " real Beings " and based his hypotheses upon such misapprehension^.^^ Most confusing of all, the t,erms " infinity " and " space " in the Ethics have " bin wonderfully perplex'd " and lead to no distinct ideas. Though Newton and Locke, albeit unwillingly, were against him on the point, Toland could " no more believe an absolute Space distinct from Matter, as the place of it; than that there is an absolute Time, different from the things whose Duration are considered." 84 For all his refutation, though, it is Spinoza's strengths, rather than his faults, that seem to have impressed John Toland.
When So I think still, notwithstanding I differ from Spinoza in the very groundwork of his Philosophy, and that I was at the same time confuting him. I can commend the man in many things, whom in other things I leave or oppose: nor is there any procedure that exposes writers to more ridiculous extravangancies, than thinking themselves oblig'd to answer every thing he advances, from whom they differ in any one thing.89
The philosophical quarrel had degenerated sadly: Wotton did not challenge the philosophical assumptions of either Spinoza or Toland; he simply charged Toland with having called Spinoza " a Great Man."
And that opinion Toland never disclaimed: though Spinoza's " system of matter without motion was undigested and unphilosophical. . . yet Spinoza was for all that a great and a good man in many respects, as may not only be seen by his works; but also by the In 1720, just when Toland was making his last defenses of Spinoza, an abridgement of Colerus' Life was published in England, together with an abstract of the Tractatus and an ambiguous p r e f a~e ?~ The old Life was substantially unchanged: Spinoza remained the noble, singular figure that Colerus had first presented, and the abstract of the Tractatus was certainly far from damning. But the writer of the Preface took no chances with the anti-Spinozists; he had made the edition, he said, "To prevent therefore the Belief that Heresy is ever the less pernicious for being attended with Humanity and Goodness," since it had come to his attention that Spinoza had
